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Price uncertainty and the existence of financial equilibrium
Lionel de Boisde¤re,1
(October 2011)
Abstract
We consider a pure exchange economy, with incomplete nancial markets, where
agents face an exogenous uncertainty, on the future state of nature, and an endoge-
nous uncertainty, on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agent
forms price anticipations on each future spot market, distributed along an idiosyn-
cratic probability law. At a sequential equilibrium, all agents expect the trueprice
as a possible outcome and elect optimal strategies at the rst period, which clear on
all markets at every time period. We show that, provided the endogenous uncertainty
is large enough, a sequential equilibrium exists under standard conditions, for all
types of nancial structures (i.e., with real, nominal and mixed assets). This result
suggests that standard existence problems of sequential equilibrium models, following
Hart (1975), stem from the single price expectation assumption.
Key words: sequential equilibrium, temporary equilibrium, perfect foresight, ex-
pectations, incomplete markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage, existence proof.
JEL Classication: D52
1 Université Paris 1, Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de
lHôpital, 75013 Paris, France. Email: lionel.de-boisde¤re@univ-paris1.fr
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1 Introduction
The traditional approach to sequential equilibrium relies on the assumption,
introduced by Radner (1972), that agents have a perfect foresightof future prices.
That is, agents anticipate with certainty exactly one price for each commodity
(or asset) in each random state, which turns out to be the true price, if that state
prevails tomorrow. At a sequential equilibrium, agents elect optimal decisions at the
rst period, which clear on all markets ex post. A convenient outcome of perfect
foresight is that equilibrium unfolds sequentially: after all uncertainty is removed,
agents never face bankruptcy, or need trade again to optimize their welfare, and all
markets clear at agentsex ante decisions. Yet, the perfect foresight assumption is a
su¢ cient but, by no means, a necessary condition to guarantee these outcomes. As
argued below, the perfect foresight equilibrium is a restrictive notion of sequential
(as opposed to temporary) equilibrium, resulting in several intricate problems.
The traditional criticism of the perfect foresight model is that, quoting Radner
himself (1982), it requires of the traders a capacity for imagination and computa-
tion far beyond what is realistic. Indeed, all traders need coordinate on the same
expectation, and forecast the future price exactly and solely, on every spot market.
Typically, if only one agent deviated privately from the common price anticipation,
all rational agents, in Radners sense, would turn out to have mistaken forecasts
ex post. This typical common knowledgerequirement (of the price forecast) is not
the only problem that the perfect foresight model embeds. This model would not
explain the e¤ects of agents (possibly irrational or mistaken) beliefs on equilib-
rium prices and quantities traded on markets. In particular, it would not explain
speculation, bubbles and crashes, observed on actual markets, as sequential equi-
librium phenomena. In some nancial economies where real assets are sold short
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unrestrainedly, a perfect foresight equilibrium may even fail to exist, as shown by
the examples of Hart (1975), Momi (2000), Busch-Govindan (2004), among others.
In general equilibrium theory, the perfect foresight model has remained, to our
knowledge, the only setting to deal with sequential equilibrium so far. Yet, all above
mentionned problems of the perfect foresight model might be solved by introducing
an alternative concept of sequential equilibrium, which lets agents be uncertain of
future prices, but cautious enough never to need revise their forecasts ex post. We
refer to the latter concept as the correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.), which is
reached when agents have anticipations, which embed tomorrows trueprice as
a possible outcome, and make optimal decisions today, which clear markets and
remain optimal ex post. In a companion paper, we show, on an example, that
the C.F.E. model indeed explains volatility, speculation and crashes on incomplete
nancial markets at a sequential equilibrium, stemming from agentsanticipations
when no change in the fundamentals takes place. Hereafter, we focus on existence
issues and prove, on a simple model with price uncertainty, that a sequential equi-
librium always exists under standard conditions, whatever the nancial structure
(i.e., with real, nominal or mixed assets), to the di¤erence of Hart and alii.
The model we propose is a two-period pure exchange economy, where agents
face an exogenous uncertainty, represented by nitely many random states of na-
ture, exchange goods on spot markets, for the purpose of consumption, and trade,
unrestrained, on (incomplete) nancial markets, so as to transfer wealth across peri-
ods and states. At the rst period, besides the above exogenous uncertainty, agents
face an endogenous uncertaintyon each future spot price. Namely, consumers have
a (private) set of plausible spot prices for each future state, called expectations, dis-
tributed along an idiosyncratic probability law, which we call a belief. The latter
2
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uncertainty is traditionally referred to as endogenous because it both a¤ects and
is focussed on the endogenous price variable. As our main Theorem, we show that,
if the support of beliefs is large enough, the existence of a C.F.E. is still guaranteed
by standard assumptions, on any nancial market.
To simplify exposition, we restrict the model to symmetric supports of beliefs,
that is, to agents having a common set of expected states and prices. This restriction
may, indeed, be dropped without changing our Theorem, but it would lead to
much longer developments, since agents might need rene their anticipations rst,
until their beliefs became consistent, in the sense that no trader had an aribtrage
opportunity, stemming from some other traders(mistaken) anticipations (see [4]).
With identical supports, the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed without any
prior renement of beliefs, which permits to skip that step.
It must be stressed that our equilibrium notion is, indeed, a sequential one,
that is, di¤ers from the temporary equilibriums, as introduced by Hicks (1939)
and developed, later, by Grandmont (1977, 1982), Green (1973), Hammond (1983),
Balasko (2003), among others, explaining why we do not extend on this literature.
At a temporary equilibrium, agents would typically revise their plans and forecasts
ex post. Indeed, only current markets need clear at agentsequilibrium decisions
and the true price needs not be anticipated by every trader correctly, which may
lead, tomorrow, to bankruptcy situations and new welfare improving exchanges.
None of these outcomes, antonymous to sequential unfolding, occurs at a C.F.E.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and its basic
concepts; Section 3 states and proves the Theorem; an Appendix proves Lemmas.
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2 The model
We consider a pure-exchange nancial economy with two time-periods (t 2 f0; 1g)
and two markets, a commodity market and a nancial market. There is an a priori
uncertainty at the rst period (t = 0) about which state s of a given state space
S will prevail at the second period (t = 1), when all uncertainty is removed. The
state of nature at t = 0 is non random and denoted by s = 0. The sets of agents
(or consumers), I := f1; :::;mg, of commodities, L := f1; :::; Lg, of states of nature,
S := f1; :::; Ng, and nancial assets, J := f1; :::; Jg, are all nite.
Before presenting the model, we introduce notations, which are used throughout.
2.1 The models notations
Throughout, we denote by  and k:k, respectively, the scalar product and Euclid-
ean norm on an Euclidean space, and by P(K) and B(K), respectively, the set of
non-empty subsets and Borel sigma-algebra of a set or topological space, K. We
let s = 0 be the non-random state at t = 0 and S 0 := f0g [ S. For all sets,
 2 fS; S 0g, A 2 P(R), B 2 P((RL)), J matrix, V (where J 2 N), tuple,
("; s; l; x; x0; y; y0) 2 R++LRR(RL)(RL), we denote by:
 A(s) 2 P(R), B(s) 2 P(RL), V (s) 2 RJ , x(s) 2 R, y(s) 2 RL, respectively,
the sets of projections, row, scalar, vector, indexed by s 2 , of A, B, V , x, y;
and we also denote As := A(s), Bs := A(s), xs := x(s) and ys := y(s);
 yl(s) := yls the lth component of y(s) 2 RL;
 x 6 x0 and y 6 y0 (resp. x << x0 & y << y0) the relations x(s) 6 x0(s) and
yl(s) 6 y0l(s) (resp. x(s) < x0(s) & yl(s) < y0l(s)) for all (l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg;
 x < x0 (resp. y < y0) the joint relations x 6 x0, x 6= x0 (resp. y 6 y0, y 6= y0);
4
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 RL := (RL), RL+ = fx 2 RL : x > 0g and R+ := fx 2 R : x > 0g,
RL++ := fx 2 RL : x >> 0g and R++ := fx 2 R : x >> 0g,
 M0 := f[p0; q] 2 RL+RJ : kp0k+ kqk = 1g;
 Ms := f[s; ps] : ps 2 RL+; kpsk = 1g and M"s := f[s; ps] 2Ms : p0 2 ["; 1]Lg, for s 2 S;
 M := s2S0Ms, M" :=M0 s2SM"s, 
 := [s2SMs and 
" := [s2SM"s.
2.2 The commodity and asset markets
The L commodities, l 2 L, are used for the purpose of consumption and may be
exchanged between agents on spot markets. There are #S0 ex ante possible spot
markets, namely one in each state s 2 S0. In each future state, s 2 S, an expectation
of the spot price, ps 2 RL+, is denoted by !s := [s; ps] 2 SRL+. At little cost, we
normalize admissible expectations in each state s 2 S to the above set Ms.
Agents exchange commodities in order to increase their welfare. Trade may take
place because each agent, i 2 I, can rely on an endowment, ei := (ei(s)) 2 RLS0++ , of the L
goods, which grants her the commodity bundle ei(0) 2 RL++ at t = 0, and ei(s) 2 RL++,
in each state s 2 S if this state prevails at t = 1. Ex post, the agents welfare is
measured by ui(x0; x1) 2 R+, where x0 := (x10; :::; xL0 ) 2 RL+ and x1 := (x11; :::; xL1 ) 2 RL+ are
the vectors of consumptions, respectively, at t = 0 and t = 1, and ui : R2L+ ! R+ is a
utility function, assumed to be C1 and strictly increasing.
At this stage, we may state a Lemma, which will permit, later, to restrict ad-
missible prices and price expectations, to some set M" for " > 0.
Lemma 1 Let e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
i(s) and  := sup @ui@yl0 (x; y)=
@ui
@yl
(x; y), for i 2 I,
(l; l0) 2 L2, (x; y) 2 ([0; e]L)2. Then, (e; ) 2 R2++ and we denote "0 := 1pL 6 1pL .
5
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Proof The proof is immediate from the fact that, for each i 2 I, ei >> 0 and ui is
C1 and strictly increasing on the compact set [0; e]2L. 
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via J
assets, also called securities, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg, which are exchanged at t = 0 and
pay o¤ at t = 1. Assets may be nominal or real (i.e., pay o¤ in account units or in
commodities). For any expectation, p := ([s; ps]) 2 s2SMs, the payo¤s, vj([s; ps]) 2 R,
of each asset j 2 f1; :::; Jg in each state s 2 S, dene a xed SJ-matrix, V (p) =
(vj([s; ps])), referred to as the payo¤ matrix, and such that V : p 2 M 7! V (p) is
continuous, from the denition. For every s 2 S and every p := ([s; ps]) 2 s2SMs, we
shall denote by V (p)(s) := V ([s; ps]) := (vj([s; ps]))j2J 2 RJ the sth-row of V (p).
Provided she can a¤ord, every agent i 2 I may take unrestrained positions, zji 2 R
(positive, if purchased; negative, if sold), in every security j 2 f1; :::; Jg, which dene
her portfolio, zi := (zji ) 2 RJ . When an asset price, q 2 RJ , is observed at t = 0, a
portofolio, z 2 RJ , is thus a contract, which costs qz units of account at t = 0, and
promises to pay V ([s; ps])z units, in each state s 2 S, for every expectation [s; ps] 2Ms,
if ps obtains. Similarly, we henceforth normalize rst period prices, !0 := (p0; q), to
the set M0 of sub-Section 2.1.
2.3 Information and beliefs
At t = 0, agents form private anticipations of future spot prices, distributed along
idiosyncratic probability laws, which represent their endogenous uncertainty.
Denition 1 For every probability, , on (
;B(
)), scalar, " 2 R++, expectation,
!s := [s; p] 2 
, we let B(!s; ") := f[s; p] 2 
 : kp   pk + js   sj < "g be an open ball
and denote by P () := f! 2 
 : (B(!; ")) > 0;8" > 0g the support of , a compact set.
A probability, , on (
;B(
)), is called a belief if the following Condition holds:
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(a) 9" 2 R++ : P ()  
".
We denote by B the set of all beliefs. Let C0(
;R) be the set of continuous map-
pings from 
 to R. A collection,  := (i), of m mappings, i : M0 ! B (for i 2 I),
is said to be an expectation structure if, for each i 2 I, the following Conditions hold:
(b) [!0 2M0, (!n0 )n2N 2MN0 , !0 = limn!1 !n0 , f 2 C0(
;R)]) [
R


fd(i(!0)) = limn!1
R


fd(i(!
n
0 ))];
(c) 8(!0; !00) 2M20, P (i(!0)) = P (1(!00)) := P  
;
(d) 
"0  P , along Condition (c) and Lemma 1 above.
We denote by ES  (BM0)m the set of all expectation structures.
Remark 1 Without changing the papers results, a belief could be dened as a
probability on S  RL+, whose support cannot take indenitely large or low values.
Normalized expectations, here, simplify presentation, but do not reduce generality.
Remark 2 Condition (b) is a standard continuity condition on a probability space.
Remark 3 Condition (c) states that observing rst period prices does not a¤ect
the support of agentsbeliefs, which are, moreover, symmetric. As explained in the
introduction, our results would still hold with asymmetric (and varying) supports.
Remark 4 Condition (d) states that agents are cautious enough not to rule out
completely any expectation of the (true) spot prices, out of a small neighborhood
of zero, namely, 
n
"0. The xed set, 
"0, could be narrowed down to what we call
the minimum incertainty set, which is the set of all possible equilibrium prices
tomorrow, given todays, when agentsbeliefs are private and vary. If Condition
(d) were reduced to the requirement that agents expectations always contained
that minimum uncertainty set, the papers existence result could still be proved
(even under agentsasymmetric information & beliefs), at the cost of long complex
developments. In a seminal paper, we prefer to keep the uncertainty set large and
7
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xed, namely, 
"0 , in order to prove and explain this existence result simply, based
on the fact that all possible equilibrium prices need be in 
"0 tomorrow (see below).
Henceforth, we assume that agents are endowed with an (arbitrary) expecta-
tion structure,  := (i) 2 ES, which is xed and always referred to, unless stated
otherwise, and we let P := P (i(!0)), and !0i := i(!0), for every pair (i; !0) 2 IM0.
2.4 Consumersbehavior and the notion of equilibrium
In this sub-Section, we assume agents observe the market price at t = 0, namely,
!0 := (p0; q) 2 M0, which is set as given, when they make make their trade and
consumption plans. The generic ith agents set of consumption plans is dened as:
Yi := Ci(P;R2L+ ) ,
where Ci(P;R2L+ ) stands for the set of consumption mappings, y : P ! RL+RL+,
such that the rst period consumption, y(0) 2 RL+, is constant (in ! 2 P) and the
second period consumption plan, ! 2 P 7! y(!) 2 RL+, makes the welfare mapping, ! 2
P 7! ui(y(0); y(!)) 2 R+, continuous. The plan y 2 Ci(P;R2L+ ), relates every spot price,
! := [s; ps] 2 P to a consumption decision, y([s; ps]) 2 RL+, for t = 1, which is conditional
on the joint conditions that state s prevailed and price ps 2 RL+ be observed tomorrow.
The continuity condition is a rationality rule, stating that no agent elects joint
consumptions, whose utilities vary discontinuously with expectations.
Each agent i 2 I elects and implements a consumption and investment decision,
or strategy, [y; z] 2 YiRJ , that she can a¤ord on markets, given her endowment,
ei 2 RLS0+ , and her expectation set, P . This denes her budget set as follows:
Bi(!0) := f[y; z] 2 YiRJ : p0(y(0)-ei(0))6  qz; ps(y([s; ps])-ei(s))6V ([s; ps])z;8[s; ps] 2 Pg:
8
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An allocation, (yi) 2 Y := mi=1Yi, is a collection of consumption plans across con-
sumers. For all price collection, (!0; p := ([s; ps])) 2M, we dene the following sets of
attainable allocations, portfolios and strategies, respectively:
A(p) := f(yi) 2 Y :
Pm
i=1(yi(0)-ei(0)) = 0; 8s 2 S; such that [s; ps] 2 P;
Pm
i=1(yi([s; ps])-ei(s)) = 0g;
Z := f(zi) 2 (RJ)m :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0g;
Y(!0; p) := f([yi; zi]) 2 mi=1Bi(!0) : (yi) 2 A(p); (zi) 2 Zg.
For every !0 2 M0, we assume that each agent i 2 I, given the rst period
price !0, has preferences represented by the V.N.M. utility function (recalling that
!0i := i(!0) 2 B is a belief):
u!0i : y 2 Yi 7! u!0i (y) :=
R
!2P ui(y(0); y(!))d
!0
i (!):
The generic ith agents behavior is, then, to elect a strategy, which maximises this
utility function in the buget set, that is, a strategy in Bi (!0) := arg max[y;z]2Bi(!0) u
!0
i (y).
The above economy, for a given expectation structure,  := (i) 2 ES, is denoted
by E. An equilibrium of this economy is a collection of market prices, (!s) 2
s2S0Ms and optimal attainable strategies. Formally:
Denition 2 A collection of prices, (!0 := [p0; q]; p := ([s; ps])) 2 M, and strategies,
([yi; zi]) 2 mi=1Bi(!0), denes a sequential equilibrium of the economy E, or correct
foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.), (respectively, a temporary equilibrium of E) if the
following Conditions (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) (respectively, Conditions (b)-(c)-(d)) hold:
(a) 8s 2 S, [s; ps] 2 P ;
(b) 8i 2 I; [yi; zi] 2 Bi (!0) := arg max[y;z]2Bi(!0) u!0i (y);
(c) (yi) 2 A(p);
(d) (zi) 2 Z.
9
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The economy E is called standard" under the two following Assumptions:
 Assumption A1: 8i 2 I; ei >> 0;
 Assumption A2: 8i 2 I, ui is class C 1, concave, and strictly increasing, i.e.,
@ui
@yl
(y) > 0, 8(y; l) 2 R2L+ f1; :::; 2Lg.
We can now state our main Theorem, which we prove in Section 3.
Theorem 1 For every  := (i) 2 ES, a standard economy, E, admits a C.F.E.
3 The existence proof
Throughout,  := (i) 2 ES is set as given and the bounds of Lemma 1, e and
"0, the beliefs, !0i := i(!0) 2 B and their common support (along Denition 1-(b)),
P := P (!0i )  
, for every (i; !0) 2 IM0, are always referred to.
The proofs principle is to construct a sequence of auxiliary economies with nite
expectations sets, each of which admits an equilibrium along Theorem 1 of [5], and
to derive from a sequence of equilibria in auxiliary economies an equilibrium of the
initial economy, E. To that aim, we need introduce auxiliary sets, in a rst step.
3.1 Auxiliary sets
We rst divide P in ner and ner partitions, letting for each n 2 N:
Kn := fkn := (k1n; :::; kLn ) 2 (N \ [0; 2n   1])Lg;
P(s;kn) := P \ (fsgl2f1;:::;Lg]k
l
n
2n ;
kln+1
2n ]), for every (s; kn := (k
1
n; :::; k
L
n )) 2 SKn.
Then, for each (s; n; kn) 2 SNKn, such that P(s;kn) 6= ?, we select one element
gn(s;kn) 2 P(s;kn), dene the set Gn := fgn(s;kn) : s 2 S; kn 2 Kn; P(s;kn) 6= ?g accordingly,
and a so-called equilibrium price, (!n0 ; pn) 2M"0 , by induction, as follows:
10
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 for n = 0, we let an arbitrary price, (!00; p0) 2M"0 , be given, we select one price
g0(s;0) 2 P(s;0) 6= ?, for each s 2 S, and dene G0 := fg0(s;0) : s 2 Sg accordingly;
 for n 2 N arbitrary, we assume the equilibrium price (!n 10 ; pn 1) 2M"0 and the
set Gn 1 := fgn 1(s;kn 1) : s 2 S; kn 1 2 Kn 1; P(s;kn 1) 6= ?g  P have been dened at
rank n-1, and we let, for every (s; kn) 2 SKn, such that P(s;kn) 6= ?,
gn(s;kn)
8>><>>:
be equal to gn 1(s;kn 1), if there exists (kn 1; g
n 1
(s;kn 1)
) 2 Kn 1Gn 1 \ P(s;kn)
be set fixed in P(s;kn); if 2 Gn 1 \ P(s;kn) = ?
.2
The above selection yields the set Gn := fgn(s;kn) 2 P(s;kn) : s 2 S; kn 2 Kng  Gn 1.
To complete the induction process, we select (!n0 ; pn) 2 M"0 as an equilibrium
price of the auxiliary economy, En, presented hereafter (in sub-Section 3.2). Then,
we repeat the induction at rank n+1, hence, at all ranks. This inductive process
yields sequences of prices, f(!n0 ; pn)gn2N 2 M"0N, and of non-decreasing price sets,
fGngn2N 2 P(P )N, whose union is everywhere dense in P , by construction.
3.2 Auxiliary economies, En
Henceforth, we set n 2 N as given. We derive from the set Gn, assumed to be
dened by induction, jointly with the past equilibrium price, (!n 10 ; pn 1) 2 M"0 , an
auxiliary economy, En, referred to as the n-economy, which is of the type described
in [5]. Namely, it is a pure exchange economy, with two period (t 2 f0; 1g), m agents,
having incomplete information, and exchanging L goods and J nominal assets, under
uncertainty (at t = 0) about which state of a nite state space, Sn, will prevail at
t = 1. Referring to [5], the n-economys characteristics are as follows:
2 Non restrictively (since we can always shift the upper boundary of P(s;kn)), we
will assume that each gn
(s;kn)
2 P(s;kn) is chosen in the interior of P(s;kn) 6= ?, to insure
that !0i (P(s;kn)) > 0, for every !0 2M0. This will serve later.
11
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 The information structure is (eSni ), where eSni := S[Sni := S[figGn, for each i 2 I.
The pooled information set (or the set of states which may prevail tomorrow)
is, hence, S = \i2I eSni . For each i 2 I, the set Sni := figGn (henceforth identied
to Gn) consists of purely formal states, none of which will prevail tomorrow.
The formal state space of the n-economy, namely, Sn = [i2I eSni , is henceforth
identied to S[Gn in the following denitions, for the sake of simpler notations.
 The SnJ payo¤ matrix, V n := (V n(sn))sn2Sn := (vnj (sn))j2J;sn2Sn , is dened by
vnj (s) := vj([s; p
n 1
s ]) and vnj (sn) := vj(sn), for each (j; s; sn) 2 f1; :::; JgSGn. Thus,
the nancial structure is purely nominal by construction.
 In each formal state, sn := [s; ps] 2 Sni u Gn, the generic agent i 2 I expects with
certainty that price ps 2 RL++ will obtain (if state sn := [s; ps] prevails).
 In each realizable state, s 2 S, the generic agent i 2 I has perfect foresight, i.e.,
anticipates with certainty the true price on the state-s spot market.
 The generic ith agents endowment, eni 2 RL++R
eSni
++ u RL++RS
n
++, is dened by
eni (s) := ei(s), for each s 2 S0, and eni (sn) := ei(s), for each sn := [s; ps] 2 Sni u Gn.
 For every collection, (!0 := [p0; q]; p := ([s; ps])s2S) 2 M, representing the true
prices on all (ex ante) possible spot markets, the generic agent i 2 I has the
following consumption set, Xn, budget set, Bni (!0; p), and utility function, uni :
Xn := RL+RL
eSni
+ u RL+RLS
n
+ ;
Bni (!0; p) := {[x; z] 2 XnRJ :
26666664
p0(x(0)  ei(0)) 6  qz
ps(x(s)  ei(s)) 6 V n(s)z; 8s 2 S
s(x(sn)  eni (sn)) 6 V n(sn)z; 8sn := [s; s] 2 Sni u Gn
};
uni : x 2 Xn 7! uni (x) :=
P
sn2Sn 
n
i (s
n)ui(x(0); x(s
n)),
12
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where ni (sn) := 
!n 10
i (P(s;kn)), for all (s; kn; sn) 2 SKn(Gn\P(s;kn)), is the probability
of the set P(s;kn), along the belief 
!n 10
i := i(!
n 1
0 ) 2 B, and ni (s) := 12n , for all s 2 S.
A Corollary of Theorem 1 in [5] and Lemma 1 above yields Lemma 2 hereafter.
Lemma 2 The generic n-economy admits an equilibrium, that is, a collection of
prices, (!0; p := ([s; ps])) 2M, and strategies, ([xi; zi]) 2 mi=0Bni (!0; p), such that :
(a) 8i 2 I; [xi; zi] 2 arg max[x;z]2Bni (!0;p) uni (x);
(b) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1(xi(s)-ei(s)) = 0;
(c)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0.
That equilibrium, C := ((!0; p); ([xi; zi])) 2 Mmi=0Bni (!0; p)), satises the relations
(!0; p) 2M"0 and xi(s) 2 [0; e]L, for each (i; s) 2 IS0, along Lemma 1.
Proof see the Appendix. 
Along Lemma 2, we set as given an equilibrium of the n-economy, namely:
Cn := (!n0 := (pn0 ; qn); pn := ([s; pns ]); ([xni ; zni ])) 2M"0mi=1Bni (!n0 ; pn) ,
3
henceforth xed and referred to as the n-equilibrium, which meets the Conditions
of Lemma 2. The equilibrium price, (!n0 ; pn) 2M"0, permits to pursue the induction
of sub-Section 3.1, at rank n+ 1, hence, at all ranks.
From Lemma 2, we will assume costlessly that the sequences f(!n0 ; pn)gn2N and
fxni (s)gn2N , for each (i; s) 2 IS0, converge, respectively, to (!0; p) in the compact
3 Let Z0n := fz 2 RJ : V n(sn)  z = 0 : 8sn 2 Sng be a vector space and Z?n be its
orthogonal complement. Non restrictively, at each step n 2 N, we let (zni ) 2 Z?n m.
In the Appendix (see proof of Lemma 3-(ii) below), this choice will make clear why
Harts (1975) typical problem of a fall in rank of the span at the equilibrium price,
which may take place and prevent equilibrium to exist under perfect foresight,
cannot occur in our model.
13
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set M"0, and xi (s), in the compact set [0; e]L, such that
P
i2I(x

i (s)-ei(s)) = 0. The
following Lemma will serve to prove Theorem 1 in the next sub-Section.
Lemma 3 Let G1 := [n2NGn and, for every (!; n) 2 PN, let argn(!) 2 Gn be
uniquely dened by (!; argn(!)) 2 P 2(s;kn), for some (s; kn) 2 SKn. For every tuple
(i; !0 := [p0; q]; ! := [s; s]; z) 2 IM0PRJ , let Bi(!0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : p0(y-ei(0)) 6  qzg
and Bi(!; z) := fy 2 RL+ : s(y-ei(s)) 6 V (!)zg. Then, the following Assertions hold:
(i) Gn  Gn+1, G1 = P , ! = limn!1 argn(!), [s; pns ] 2 P , [s; ps] 2 P , 8(!; n; s) 2 PNS;
(ii) 9r 2 R++ : 8n 2 N;
Pm
i=1 kzni k < r; so, we assume there exists (zi ) = limn!1(zni ) 2 Z;
(iii) 9 2 R++ : 8(i; n; sn) 2 INf0g [ Sn; kxni (sn)k 6 ;
(iv) 8(i; s) 2 IS, xi (s) 2 arg maxy2Bi([s;ps ];zi ) ui(xi (0); y), and we let yi([s; ps]) := xi (s);
(v) For every i 2 I, the correspondence ! 2 P 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi (0); y) is upper-
semi continuous with non-empty values;
(vi) For all (s; ! := [s; s]) 2 SPnf[s; ps]g, we set as given yi(!) 2 arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi (0); y).
The selection yi : ! 2 P 7! yi(!) (dened from (iv) & above) satises yi :=[xi (0); yi] 2 Yi;
(vii) as dened from (vi), for every i 2 I, u!0i (yi ) = limn!1 uni (xni ) 2 R+;
(viii) as dened from (vi), (yi ) 2 A(p).
Proof see the Appendix. 
3.3 An equilibrium of the initial economy, E
We can prove Theorem 1, via the following Claim.
Claim 1 The collection of prices, (!0; p) = limn!1(!n0 ; pn) 2 M"0, portfolios, (zi ) =
limn!1(zni ) 2 Z, and allocation, (yi ) 2 Y := i2IYi, along Lemma 3, denes a sequen-
tial equilibrium of the economy E.
Proof Let C := ((!0; p); ([yi ; zi ])) be dened from Claim 1 and use the notations
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.16 (Version révisée)
of Lemma 3. From Lemma 3-(i)-(ii)-(viii), C meets Conditions (a)-(c)-(d) of the
above Denition 2 of equilibrium. Hence, Claim 1 will be proved if we show that
[yi ; z

i ] 2 Bi(!0), for each i 2 I, and that C meets Condition (b) of Denition 2.
Let i 2 I be given. From the denition of Cn, the relations pn0 (xni (0)-ei(0)) 6  qnzni
hold, for each n 2 N, and yield in the limit: p0(yi (0)-ei(0)) := p0(xi (0)-ei(0)) 6  qzi .
The relations s(yi ([s; s])-ei(s)) 6 V ([s; s])zi hold, for all (s; [s; s]) 2 S  P , from
Lemma 3-(iv)-(vi), and imply, from Lemma 3-(vi) and above: [yi ; zi ] 2 mi=1Bi(!0).
Assume, by contraposition, that C fails to meet Denition 2-(b), e.g., there exist
[y1; z1] 2 B1(!0) and " 2 R++, henceforth set as given, such that:
(I) "+ u
!0
1 (y

1) < u
!0
1 (y1).
We may assume that there exists  2 R++, such that:
(II) yl1(!) > , for every (!; l) 2 f0g [ P  L.
If not, for every  2 [0; 1], we dene the strategy [y1 ; z1 ] := [(1 )y1 +e1; (1 )z1],
which belongs to B1(!0), a convex set. From Assumption A1, the strategy [y1 ; z1 ]
meets relations (II) whenever  > 0. Moreover, from relation (I) and the uniform
continuity of (; !) 2 [0; 1] P 7! u1(y1 (0); y1 (!)) on a compact set (which holds from
Assumption A2 and the relation y1 2 Y1), the strategy [y1 ; z1 ] also meets relation
(I), for every  > 0, small enough. So, we may assume relations (II).
We let the reader check, as immediate from the relations (II), [y1; z1] 2 B1(!0) and
(!0; p
) 2 M"0 , Assumption A2, same continuity arguments as above (& that of the
scalar product), that we may also assume there exists  2 R++, such that:
(III) p0(y1(0)-e1(0)) 6    qz1 and s(y1([s; s])-e1(s)) 6  + V ([s; s])z1, 8[s; s] 2 P .
15
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Finally, from relations (III), the continuity of V and of the scalar product, the
relation (!0; p) = limn!1(!n0 ; pn) and Lemma 3-(i)-(ii), there exists N1 2 N, such that:
(IV )
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pn0 (y1(0)  e1(0)) 6  qnz1
pns (y1([s; pns ])  e1(s)) 6 V n(s)z1; 8s 2 S
s(y1(sn)  en1 (sn)) 6 V n(sn)z1; 8sn := [s; s] 2 Sn1 u Gn
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
, for all n > N1.
Along relations (IV ) and Lemma 3-(i), for each n > N1, we let [yn1 ; z1] 2 Bn1 (!n0 ; pn)
be the strategy dened by yn1 (0) := y1(0), yn1 (s) := y1([s; pns ]), for every s 2 S, and
yn1 (s
n) := y1(s
n), for every sn 2 Sn1 u Gn, and recall that:
 u!01 (y1) :=
R
!2P u1(y1(0); y1(!))d
!0
1 (!) and u
!0
1 (y

1) :=
R
!2P u1(y

1(0); y

1(!))d
!0
1 (!);
 un1 (xn1 ) 
P
s2S
un1 (x
n
1 (0);x
n
1 (s))
2n :=
P
!2Gn u1(x
n
1 (0); x
n
1 (!))
n
1 (!);
 un1 (yn1 ) 
P
s2S
un1 (y
n
1 (0);y
n
1 (s))
2n :=
P
!2Gn u1(y
n
1 (0); y
n
1 (!))
n
1 (!).
Then, from the above denitions, the uniform continuity of ! 2 P 7! u1(y1(0); y1(!))
on a compact set and Condition (d) of Denition 1 applied to y1 2 Y1, it is immediate
that there exists N2 > N1 such that the following relations hold, for every n > N2:
(V )
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
ju!01 (y1)  un1 (yn1 )j
< "8 + j
R
!2P u1(y1(0); y1(!))d
!0
1 (!) 
P
!2Gn u1(y
n
1 (0); y
n
1 (!))
n
1 (!)j
< "8 + j
R
!2P u1(y1(0); y1(!))d
!0
1 (!) 
R
!2P u1(y1(0); y1(!))d
!n 10
1 (!))j
+ j R
!2P u1(y1(0); y1(!))d
!n 10
1 (!)) 
P
!2Gn u1(y
n
1 (0); y
n
1 (!))
n
1 (!)j
< "4 + j
R
!2P u1(y1(0); y1(!))d
!n 10
1 (!)) 
P
!2Gn u1(y
n
1 (0); y
n
1 (!))
n
1 (!)j
< "2
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
From the denition of n-equilibria (for each n 2 N) and Lemma 3-(vii), there
exists N3 > N2, such that:
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(V I) un1 (y
n
1 ) 6 un1 (xn1 ) < "2 + u
!0
1 (y

1), for every n > N3.
Let n > N3 be given. The above Conditions (I)-(V )-(V I) yield, jointly:
u
!0
1 (y1) <
"
2 + u
n
1 (y
n
1 ) < "+ u
!0
1 (y

1) < u
!0
1 (y1).
This contradiction proves that C is a C.F.E., hence, it completes the proof of
Claim 1 and of Theorem 1. 
Appendix: proof of the Lemmas
Lemma 2 The generic n-economy admits an equilibrium, that is, a collection of
prices, (!0; p := ([s; ps])) 2M, and strategies, ([xi; zi]) 2 mi=0Bni (!0; p), such that :
(a) 8i 2 I; [xi; zi] 2 arg max[x;z]2Bni (!0;p) uni (x);
(b) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1(xi(s)-ei(s)) = 0;
(c)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0.
That equilibrium, C := ((!0; p); ([xi; zi])) 2 Mmi=0Bni (!0; p)), satises the relations
(!0; p) 2M"0 and xi(s) 2 [0; e]L, for each (i; s) 2 IS0, along Lemma 1.
Proof Let n 2 N be given. The n-economy is, formally, one of the type presented
in [5] and admits an equilibrium along Denition 3 and Theorem 1 of [5] and
its proof, that is, a collection of (normalized) prices, (!0; p) 2 M, and strategies,
([xi; zi])) 2 mi=1Bni (!0; p), which satisfy Condions (a)-(b)-(c) of Lemma 2.
Let C := (!0; p; ([xi; zi])) be an equilibrium of En and (e; ; "0) 2 R3++ be the bounds
of Lemma 1. Then, for each s 2 S0, the relations (xi(s)) > 0 and
Pm
i=1(xi(s)-ei(s)) =
0, which hold from Lemma 2-(b), imply xi(s) 2 [0; e]L, for each i 2 I, whereas
the relation ps 2 RL++ is standard (from Assumption A2 and Lemma 2-(a)). Let
(s; (l; l0)) 2 S  L2 be given. We show, rst, that the relation pls
pl0s
6  holds for
17
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 := supi2I;(l;l0)2L2;(x;y)2([0;e]L)2
@ui
@vl
(x; y)= @ui
@vl0
(x; y) 2 R, along Lemma 1. Otherwise, it
is easy to check (from Lemma 2-(b) and Assumptions A1-A2 ) that there exist
an agent, i 2 I, such that xli(s) > 0, and a consumption, yi 2 Xn, dened by
yl
0
i (s) := x
l0
i (s)+
"
pl0s
and yli(s) := xli(s)- "pls (for " 2 R++ small enough), and y
l
i(s
n) := xli(s
n),
for every (sn; l) 2 eSni Lnf(s; l); (s; l0)g, such that [yi; zi] 2 Bni (!0; p) and uni (yi) > uni (xi).
The latter conditions contradict the fact that C meets Lemma 2-(a). We let the
reader check that the joint relations ps >> 0, kpsk = 1 and p
l
s
pl0s
6 , which hold from
above for all (s; (l; l0)) 2 SL2, imply pls > 1pL , for all (s; l) 2 SL, i.e., (!0; p) 2M"0 . 
Lemma 3 Let G1 := [n2NGn and, for every (!; n) 2 PN, let argn(!) 2 Gn be
uniquely dened by (!; argn(!)) 2 P 2(s;kn), for some (s; kn) 2 SKn. For every tuple
(i; !0 := [p0; q]; ! := [s; s]; z) 2 IM0PRJ , let Bi(!0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : p0(y-ei(0)) 6  qzg
and Bi(!; z) := fy 2 RL+ : s(y-ei(s)) 6 V (!)zg. Then, the following Assertions hold:
(i) Gn  Gn+1, G1 = P , ! = limn!1 argn(!), [s; pns ] 2 P , [s; ps] 2 P , 8(!; n; s) 2 PNS;
(ii) 9r 2 R++ : 8n 2 N;
Pm
i=1 kzni k < r; so, we assume there exists (zi ) = limn!1(zni ) 2 Z;
(iii) 9 2 R++ : 8(i; n; sn) 2 INf0g [ Sn; kxni (sn)k 6 ;
(iv) 8(i; s) 2 IS, xi (s) 2 arg maxy2Bi([s;ps ];zi ) ui(xi (0); y), and we let yi([s; ps]) := xi (s);
(v) For every i 2 I, the correspondence ! 2 P 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi (0); y) is upper-
semi continuous with non-empty values;
(vi) For all (s; ! := [s; s]) 2 SPnf[s; ps]g, we set as given yi(!) 2 arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi (0); y).
The selection yi : ! 2 P 7! yi(!) (dened from (iv) & above) satises yi :=[xi (0); yi] 2 Yi;
(vii) as dened from (vi), for every i 2 I, u!0i (yi ) = limn!1 uni (xni ) 2 R+;
(viii) as dened from (vi), (yi ) 2 A(p).
Proof Assertion (i) is immediate from the denitions (in particular, Condition (d)
of Denition 1 and the relation (!n0 ; pn) 2M"0 of the generic n-equilibrium), and from
the compactness of P . 
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Assertion (ii). From Denition 1, let " 2]0; 1] (which exists) satisfy P  
" and
let  := maxi2I keik" . Then, it follows from the denition of Cn (for each n 2 N) that:
(I) [(zni ) 2 Z and V (sn)zni >  , 8(i; n; sn) 2 INSn].
We recall from footnote 3 and the denition of V n that zni 2 Z?n := (Z0n)?, for each
(i; n) 2 IN, where Z0n := fz 2 RJ : V (sn)z = 0 : 8sn 2 Sng is a vector space. The fact
that fSngn2N is non-decreasing implies that fZ?n gn2N is non-decreasing in (RJ)m.
Hence, there exists N0 2 N, henceforth xed, such that Z?n = Z?N0 for every n > N0.
Assume, by contradiction, that Lemma 3-(ii) fails, i.e., there exists an extracted
sub-sequence of n-equilibria, fC'(n)gn2N := f(!'(n)0 ; p'(n); ([x'(n)i ; z'(n)i ]))gn2N , such that
n < k(z'(n)i )k 6 n + 1, for each n 2 N. For each n > N0, the strategy collection
([exni ; ezni ]) := ( 1n [x'(n)i + (n-1)e'(n)i ; z'(n)i ]), belongs to the convex set mi=1B'(n)i (!'(n)0 ; '(n)i )
and, from above, meets the relations (ezni ) 2 Z \ Z?N0m and 1 < k(ezni )k 6 1 + 1n . Hence,
from Condition (I) and above:
(II) [(ezni ) 2 Z\(Z?N0)m and V (sn)ezni >  n , 8i 2 I; 8sn 2 SN0  S'(n)], for each n > N0.
From Condition (II), the bounded sequence f(ezni )gn>N0 may be assumed to con-
verge, say to (ezi ) 2 Z \ (Z?N0)m, a closed set, such that k(ezi )k = 1, and, from the
continuity of the scalar product:
(III) [(ezi ) 2 Z \ (Z?N0)m and V (sn)ezi > 0, 8(i; sn) 2 ISN0 ].
From ([3], Propositions 2.1 & 3.1, pp. 398 & 401), that Condition (III) implies
that (ezi ) 2 (Z0N0)m \ (Z?N0)m = f0g, which contradicts the above relation, k(ezi )k = 1. 
Assertion (iii) Let W := sup[s;ps]2P kV ([s; ps])k 2 R+ (since V is continuous and P
is compact), e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
i(s), " := inf [s;ps]2P;l2L pls 2]0; "0], along Denition
19
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1, and Z := supn2N k(zni )k 2 R+, along Lemma 3-(ii), be given. Then, for every
(i; n; sn) 2 INSn, Lemma 3-(i) and the relation [xni ; zni ] 2 B1(!n0 ; pn) imply:
ns (xni (sn)-ei(s)) =
PL
l=1 
nl
s (xnli (sn)-eli(s)) 6WZ;
nls (xnli (sn)-eli(s)) 6WZ + e;
xnli (s
n) 6 WZ+e" + e;
kxni (sn)k 6  := LWZ+e" + Le.
Hence, from Lemma 2, kxni (sn)k 6  := LWZ+e" +Le, for all (n; sn) 2 Nf0g[Sn. 
Assertion (iv) Let (i; s) 2 IS be given.
For every (i; n; !0 := [p0; q]; ! := [s; s]; !0; z) 2 INM0PPRJ , we recall and let:
Bi(!0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : p0  (y   ei(0)) 6  q  zg;
Bi(!; z) := fy 2 RL+ : s  (y   ei(s)) 6 V (!)  zg;
B0i(!; !
0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : s  (y   ei(s)) 6 V (!0)  zg.
For each n 2 N, the fact that Cn is a n-equilibrium implies:
(I) xni (s) 2 arg maxy2B0i([s;pns ];[s;pn 1s ];zni ) ui(x
n
i (0); y).
As a standard result (see, e.g., [6], 4, p. 19), the correspondence (x; !; !0; z) 7!
arg maxy2Bi(!;!0;z) ui(x; y) is upper semi-continuous, from the continuity of the map-
ping, ui, and correspondence, B0i, whereas, from Lemma 3-(ii) and above, (xi (0); xi (s); ps; zi ) =
limn!1(xni (0); x
n
i (s); p
n
s ; z
n
i ). Hence, the relations of Condition (I) pass to the limit,
which yields: xi (s) 2 arg maxy2Bi([s;ps ];zi ) ui(xi (0); y). 
Assertion (v) For all (i; !; n) 2 IPN, the fact that Cn is a n-equilibrium yields:
(I) xni (arg
n(!)) 2 arg maxy2Bi(argn(!);zni ) ui(xni (0); y).
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From Lemma 3-(i)-(ii), the relation (!; xi (0); zi ) = limn!1(argn(!); xni (0); zni ) holds,
whereas, from ([6], 4, p. 19) and the continuity of ui and Bi, the correspondence
(x; !; z) 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;;z) ui(x; y) is upper semi-continuous, for every (i; !) 2 I  P .
Hence, passing to the limit into Condition (I) yields: arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i (0); y) 6= ?
and arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i (0); y) is upper semi-continuous, for every (i; !) 2 I  P . 
Assertion (vi) Let i 2 I be given and yi be dened along Lemma 3-(vi), that is, for
every ! 2 Pn [s2S [s; ps], we let yi(!) be a selection yi(!) 2 arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi (0); y)
and, for each s 2 S, we let yi([s; ps]) := xi (s). From Lemma 3-(i)-(iv)-(v), the mapping
! 2 P 7! yi(!) 2 RL+ is perfectly dened and such that yi(!) 2 arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi (0); y),
for every ! 2 P . Moreover, since ui and Bi are continuous, it follows from ([6], 4, p.
19), that the mapping ! 2 P 7! ui(xi (0); yi(!)) is continuous, i.e., yi :=[xi (0); yi] 2 Yi. 
Assertion (vii) Let i 2 I and yi := [xi (0); yi] 2 Yi be given, along Lemma 3-(vi).
As above, from the continuity of ui and Bi, and from ([6], 4, p. 19), the mapping
[y0; !; z] 2 RL+PRJ 7! Ui(y0; !; z) = maxy2Bi(!;z) ui(y0; y) is continuous (on its domain),
whereas the relation ui(xni (0); xni (!n)) = Ui(xni (0); !n; zni ) holds, for every !n 2 Gn, from
the fact that Cn is a n-equilibrium, and ui(xi (0); yi(!)) = Ui(xi (0); !; zi ) holds, for
every ! 2 P , from the denition of yi.
From Lemma 3-(i), for every ! 2 P , the sequence f!ng := fargn(!) 2 Gng, converges
(uniformly on P) to !. From above, the continuity of Ui and Lemma 3-(ii), the rela-
tions ui(xi (0); yi(!)) = Ui(xi (0); !; zi ) = limn!1 Ui(xni (0); !n; zni ) = limn!1 ui(xni (0); xni (!n))
hold, for every ! 2 P . These relations yield, from the uniform continuity of Ui on a
compact set, and the uniform convergence of f(xni (0); !n; zni )g to (xi (0); !; zi ):
(I) 8" > 0; 9n1" 2 N : 8n > n1"; 8! 2 P , kui(xi (0); yi(!))  ui(xni (0); xni (!n))k < ".
For every n 2 N, we let yni : P ! RL+ be dened (from Lemma 3-(i)) by:
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 yni (0) := xni (0) 2 RL+ and yni (!) := xni (argn(!)) := xni (!n)) 2 RL+, for every ! 2 P ;
We recall the following denitions (for each n 2 N):
 u!0i (yi ) :=
R
!2P ui(y

i (0); yi(!))d
!0
i (!);
 uni (xni ) 
P
s2S
uni (x
n
i (0);x
n
i (s))
2n :=
P
!2Gn ui(x
n
i (0); x
n
i (!))
n
i (!) =
R
!2P ui(y
n
i (0); y
n
i (!))d
!n 10
i (!).
Let " > 0 be given. From Assumption A2, Lemma 3-(iii)-(vi), Condition (I) above
and Denition 1-(a), the following relations hold, in steps:
(II) 9n2" > n1" : 8n > n2"; ju!

0
i (y

i )  uni (xni )j
< "+ j R
!2P ui(y

i (0); yi(!))d
!0
i (!) 
R
!2P ui(y
n
i (0); y
n
i (!))d
!n 10
i (!))j
6 "+ j R
!2P ui(y

i (0); yi(!))d
!0
i (!) 
R
!2P ui(y

i (0); yi(!))d
!n 10
i (!))j
+j R
!2P [ui(y

i (0); yi(!))  u1(yni (0); yni (!))]d!
n 1
0
i (!)j
6 2"+ j R
!2P [ui(x

i (0); yi(!))  u1(xni (0); xni (!n))]d!
n 1
0
i (!)j 6 3".
That is, u!

0
i (y

i ) = limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ). 
Assertion (viii) From the denition of Cn, the relations Pmi=1(xni (s)-ei(s)) = 0 hold,
for every (n; s) 2 NS0, and, passing to the limit (n!1), yield: Pmi=1(xi (s)-ei(s)) = 0,
for each s 2 S0. The latter relations imply, from Lemma 3-(vi): (yi ) 2 A(p). 
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